



“Now it’s your choice”: Nondirective genetic counseling, 
other minds, place and counselee empowerment  
 





Abstract: In this article we use a variety of philosophical literature to support 
and clarify the tenets and importance of a form of nondirective genetic 
counseling. We do this by referring to the problem of other minds and our 
philosophy of place which is informed by Jung, Lacan, Heidegger, Malpas 
and Zizek. Our major thesis is that nondirective counseling is the most ethical 
way to help a counselee. A genetic counselor cannot enter into the lived first 
person conscious experience of the counselee and so can never really know 
the best decisions for each individual person. Ultimately, we argue that in 
most cases, choices and decisions need to be made by the counselee so that 
they are able to discover their non-obstructed home or place in the world 
where their mental health awaits them. We argue that counselee decisions in 
genetic counseling cannot be prescribed as ‘prepackaged’ solutions because 
the best outcome is facilitated by the nature of the therapeutic alliance and the 
unique interaction between the place of each individual counselor and 
counselee. 
 
Keywords: genetic counseling, other minds, place  
 
INTRODUCTION  
As a result of the unbridgeable gap presented by the problem of other 
minds, we encourage the development of therapeutic relationships and 
alliances that recognise and respect the beliefs and final decision of the 
counselee. Moreover, we acknowledge that it is the effectiveness of the 
therapeutic relationship itself that has significant impact on positive 
counseling outcomes. We argue that humility, open-mindedness, 
unassuming judgment and respect for alterity, otherness and difference 
are consistent with the nature of virtuous genetic counseling. We 
consider these as having distinct relevance to genetic counseling and as 
such are important extensions on the usual psychotherapy (counseling) 
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virtues or regulative ideals identified elsewhere as compassionate 
empathy, respectful positive regard, congruence and trustworthiness 
(Crowden 2008). While counselors should not tell counselees what to 
do by respecting their decisions and how they arrive at them, in order 
to prevent counterintuitive consequences, the counselor should develop 
an ability (practical wisdom or Aristotelian phronesis) so that they 
know when it is ethical to stop any actions that are unethical, harmful 
or that they have a legal obligation to stop. We justify this by noting 
the problem of other minds also applies to the mind of the counselor, 
so they also have authority over their responses to the counselee. 
Ultimately all outcomes of the counseling session are determined 
through a unique place of dialectic or dialogue between the counselor 
and counselee. Our ideas concerning this outcome take some 
inspiration from our earlier publications on virtue ethics and place 
(Crowden, Gildersleeve 2019). As a result, we claim that decisions in 
genetic counseling cannot be prescribed as ‘prepackaged’ solutions 
because the best outcome is determined by the unique interaction 
between the place of each individual counselor and counselee.  
Finally, our reference to counselee choice in the title is important 
not only for the general mindset of the counselee in genetic counseling 
(who are encouraged to take or leave using the suggestions provided 
by the counselor) but also for applying to the arguments we outline in 
this article. Since we also encounter the problem of other minds of our 
readers, we have no proof that our arguments should apply or be valid 
for those who read this and therefore we leave it to each individual to 
determine if our ideas are valuable to them or not. To do otherwise 
would hubristically ignore the problem of other minds.  
 
GENETIC COUNSELING AND THE PSYCHOTHERAPY 
RELATIONSHIP  
The foundations of counseling and psychotherapy assume that it is 
possible for one person to resolve a problem through the process of 
listening to, and talking with, another (Symington 2006, 2). The 
psychotherapist’s goal is to increase choices by assisting the recipient 
of psychotherapy (the counselee) to experience a sense of 
psychological well-being, an increased awareness of their self, and an 
appreciation of how their self connects with other’s experiences, so 
that they are better able to develop the skills necessary for dealing with 
the challenges of life. Such goals can only be realised if a counselor or 
psychotherapist is able to create a strong therapeutic relationship and 
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alliance with a counselee. Thus, a core condition that informs the 
character of counseling and psychotherapy is the psychotherapeutic 
relationship and alliance itself.  
Psychotherapeutic relationships are not all the same. Psychotherapy 
is not practiced by all therapists at a consistently intimate or deep level 
of relationship. It is usual to identify at least three different levels of 
psychotherapeutic relationship. We can call these respectively 
Psychotherapy relationship level 1, level 2, and level 3. For 
convenience we modify Cawley’s levels and identify the different 
levels as Pr1, Pr2, and Pr3 (Cawley 1977). Accordingly, Pr1 is akin to 
what any good General Practitioner (GP), Registered Nurse (RN), 
school counselor or other health professional would do to provide 
appropriate supportive psychotherapy and counseling. Psychotherapy 
at this level often involves the straightforward unburdening of 
problems to a sympathetic listener and ventilation of thoughts, feeling 
and actions within a supportive relationship. The next level, Pr2, is 
what the good Psychiatrist, Psychiatric/Mental Health Nurse, Social 
Worker, Psychologist or other mental health professional does. 
Psychotherapy may be eclectic, is inclusive of the attributes of Pr1 but 
further extends psychotherapeutic processes to a deeper discussion of 
patient problems. At Pr2 a non-judgemental professional would be 
expected to be familiar with the nature of mental health to the extent 
that therapy includes attention being paid to the clarification of 
problems; identifying their nature and origin within a deepening 
therapeutic relationship which includes the therapist acknowledging 
and confronting patient defences. The final level of therapy, Pr3, is 
akin to the depth of practice represented in the quote by Symington 
that was used to open this section. Psychotherapy at this level is 
normally undertaken by specially trained and qualified 
psychotherapists from a range of different mental health disciplines, 
(psychiatry, psychology psychiatric/mental health nursing, medical, 
and other health care professionals), and is inclusive of those 
characteristics outlined for the previous two levels. Also, the 
psychotherapist usually uses more complex psychotherapeutic 
processes such as interpretation of unconscious motives and 
transference phenomena, repetition remembering and reconstruction of 
past experiences, regression techniques and resolution of conflicts by 
re-experience strategies and analysis within deeper therapeutic 
relationships (Bateman et al. 2010).  
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Each of the three levels are quite different. For instance, while there 
may be some similarities between Pr1 and Pr3 in relation to 
therapeutic unburdening of problems, ventilation of feelings, 
discussion of problems, support within a ‘working alliance’, and the 
like, there are very real differences too. At Pr1 defences are supported 
and reinforced while at Pr3 defences are confronted and modified. 
Patient anxiety is kept to a minimum with Pr1 while an optimal level 
of anxiety is sought and explored in Pr3 practice. Transference is 
minimised in Pr1 and fostered, revealed and analysed in Pr3. Also, at 
the Pr1 level practice regression is discouraged, reporting of dreams is 
not encouraged and advice is offered as necessary. At Pr3 regression is 
allowed within sessions, reporting of dreams is welcomed, and advice 
is withheld (Bateman 2000, 95).  
At Pr1 the psychotherapeutic relationship is not deep. Accordingly, 
it may be suggested that Pr1 should not really even qualify as 
psychotherapy. However, this criticism would be misplaced. It is 
important to recognise that psychotherapy takes place on a continuum. 
All three levels are integral to the process of psychotherapy. The goals 
of psychotherapy at each different level are the same. What is different 
is the way the goals at each level inform the regulative ideals of 
practice.  For instance, psychotherapists at all levels attempt to 
encourage recipients to have increased choice through the development 
of a trusting relationship. A GP at Pr1 may be more willing to disclose 
information to a third party than a psychotherapist conducting a long-
term analysis at Pr3. At each level a therapist has the goal to increase 
the recipient’s choices. However, there are very different shared 
understandings about the nature of the therapeutic relationship at each 
level. Moreover, as the depth of the psychotherapeutic relationship 
increases, recipient expectations about the psychotherapist’s character 
inevitably differ too.  
Core psychotherapy characteristics are relevant too and encompass 
all levels of therapy. There are core psychotherapist virtues such as 
respectful positive regard, compassionate empathy, congruence and 
trustworthiness. However, as the character of psychotherapy varies at 
each level, psychotherapists apply psychotherapy virtues in different 
ways at each respective level of practice. For example, we can assume 
that all psychotherapists act from the virtue of trustworthiness as they 
attempt to create strong therapeutic alliances with patients. However 
what trust means in any particular therapeutic relationship situation can 
vary. Acting from trustworthiness will mean that all psychotherapists 
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will maintain confidentiality to some extent. However, a 
psychotherapist at a school counseling service (Pr1) may not maintain 
as stringent a level of confidentiality as a psychoanalyst in a Pr3 
relationship. In counseling practice in schools, it is often disclosed to 
the recipients of counseling that there are many exemptions to the 
requirement for confidentiality. On the other hand, like criminal 
lawyers, some journalists and catholic priests who refuse to disclose to 
a third-party information shared in confession, many psychoanalysts at 
Pr3 often choose to maintain absolute or near-absolute confidentiality 
in many situations (Crowden 2008).  
Such distinct nuances of the psychotherapy process can only really 
be appreciated when the differing depth or level of psychotherapeutic 
exploration that is undertaken within various types of 
psychotherapeutic relationship is appreciated. It is important to 
recognise that the levels are on a continuum, meaning that there will be 
a natural overlap between each level of psychotherapy. However, 
differentiating each respective level of psychotherapeutic relationship 
depth as we have done allows one to better appreciate how the ethical 
demands requirements for ethical psychotherapy practice may differ 
and be distinctive in relation to each different level of relationship. 
Parallel examples can also arguably be seen in other health 
professions. For instance, the depth of a therapeutic relationship that a 
patient has with a nurse who is measuring baseline physical 
observations such as temperature, pulse and blood pressure before the 
patient’s ingrown toe nail operation will be very different from the sort 
of relationship that a pregnant woman has with the midwife who is 
managing her homebirth. Any therapeutic relationship can be 
differentiated from another by the level of depth of the relationship 
itself. Moreover, while health professionals’ goals, motivations and 
dispositions in different relationships may be similar, how the 
corresponding virtues and regulative ideals are likely to be played out 
can be very different. This certainly applies in psychotherapy. 
Psychotherapy goals may be consistent but the way the goals at each 
level inform the regulative ideals of practice differs. Understanding the 
different levels of psychotherapist relationship depth goes some way 
toward explaining why different ethical decision-making and actions 
by individual psychotherapists occur in what may often appear to be 
similar situations.  
Genetic Counseling sits in a distinct place within the frame and 
milieu of counseling and psychotherapy. The Human Genetics Society 
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of Australasia (HGSA) rightly identifies genetic counseling as a 
communication process which aims to help individuals, couples and 
families understand and adapt to the medical, psychological, familial 
and reproductive implications of the genetic contribution to specific 
health conditions. The process integrates  
 
Interpretation of family and medical histories to assess the chance of disease 
occurrence or recurrence. Education about the natural history of the condition, 
inheritance pattern, testing, management, prevention, support resources and 
research. Counseling to promote informed choices in view of risk assessment, 
family goals, ethical and religious values. Support to encourage the best 
possible adjustment to the disorder in an affected family member and/or to the 
risk of recurrence of that disorder” (Resta et al 2006, 80).  
 
Thus, we see that genetic counseling is a practice that primarily 
operates as a level 1 and level 2 psychotherapy. However, it is 
important to note that, primarily because of the sorts of life changing 
decisions and choices that counselees may be required to make, genetic 
counseling at times can enter into a deeper level 3 psychotherapy 
practice relationships. This has implications for the training and 
preparation of genetic counselors.  
 
NONDIRECTIVE GENETIC COUNSELING  
Weil (2003, 200) explains the “Sarah Lawrence College in 1969, 
initiated a period of more organized theory and education in genetic 
counseling”. He states “the Sarah Lawrence Program adopted Carl 
Roger’s theory of nondirective counseling” as a way of developing 
genetic counseling. Roger’s ideas can be understood as leading genetic 
counselors to be concerned with “supporting the beliefs, values, and 
decision making process of the counselee”. Weil suggests that non-
directive genetic counseling developed from changing social and 
political attitudes “with the abortion rights, patient rights, disability 
rights, and feminist movements all providing support for reproductive 
decision making based on the beliefs and values of the individuals 
involved” (Ibid, 201).  
Nondirective genetic counseling is supported by the American 
Society of Human Genetics which states genetic counseling involves 
“help[ing] the individual or family...choose the course of action which 
seems appropriate to them” and “The Code of Ethics of the National 
Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC) also states in part that genetic 
counselors “Respect their clients’ beliefs, cultural traditions, 
inclinations, circumstances, and feelings,” to “Enable their clients to 
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make informed independent decisions, free of coercion” (Weil 2003, 
201). Furthermore, the “Code of Ethical Principles for Genetics 
Professionals” states that genetic professionals should “provide 
counseling that is nondirective...and [that] respect[s]the choices of 
patients and families” (Ibid).  
A broad definition of nondirectiveness is “to promote active, 
knowledgeable counseling that supports counselee autonomy, 
facilitates informed decision making” or “[Nondirectiveness] describes 
procedures aimed at promoting the autonomy and self-directedness of 
the client” (Weil 2003, 203). Congruent with other publications on this 
topic we understand “genetic counseling as a highly circumscribed 
form of psychotherapy in which effective communication of genetic 
information is a central therapeutic goal” (Austin, Semaka, 
Hadjipavlou 2014, 903). We show how we believe genetic counseling 
relates to psychoanalytic psychotherapy in our section ‘Place, 
Psychoanalysis and Genetic Counseling’.  
Our ideas in this later section align genetic counseling with 
psychotherapy which is the application of “established psychological 
principles for the purpose of assisting people to modify their behaviors, 
cognitions, emotions, and/or other personal characteristics in directions 
that the participants deem desirable” (Ibid, 904). We highlight how our 
philosophy of place and psychoanalysis combined with nondirective 
genetic counseling can “provide symptom relief and personality 
change, reduce future symptomatic episodes, enhance quality of life, 
promote adaptive functioning in work/school and relationships” and 
“increase the likelihood of making healthy life choices” (Ibid).  
Our article provides further insight to show how nondirective 
genetic counseling is “a helping relationship in which one person has 
the knowledge and skills relevant to helping another person address a 
problem through conversation” (Ibid) where the genetic counselor 
helps the counselee “understand and adapt to the medical, 
psychological, and familial implications of genetic contributions to 
disease” (Ibid). We also outline a philosophical and psychoanalytic 
basis to explain why genetic counseling can “evoke feelings of shame 
and guilt, especially when psychological concerns are not addressed” 
(Ibid). We agree that genetic counseling should be “a 
psychoeducational process focused on the communication of genetic 
information that is embedded within a therapeutic relationship” (Ibid, 
908).  
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The major argument we present is built from the philosophical 
problem of other minds. We discuss this in greater detail in the next 
section but as an introduction we wish to highlight that Kessler has 
implicitly recognized this problem and its relationship to nondirective 
counseling stating “‘the counselor does not share the same life space, 
life history, and life dilemmas’ as the counselee, that the counselor 
may be confused and uncertain herself, and that the counselor ‘does 
not share in the economic, social, and psychological consequences of a 
counselee's decision’ and so cannot honestly share in the ‘agony of 
decision’” (Kessler cited in Kopinsky 1992, 345). Our use of the 
problem of other minds provides stronger support for nondirective 
counseling and for those who recognize “the fact that the counselor 
and counselee may hold different values in life” (Kopinsky 1992, 345).  
Fortunately, “the principle of nondirectiveness has come to be seen 
as a ‘universal norm’ in relation to genetic counseling” (Williams, 
Alderson, Farsides 2002, 339). In the next section we will outline why 
this is important and why nondirectiveness should continue to be 
practiced in genetic counseling. Williams et.al (2002, 339) explain 
“client autonomy can best be encouraged within this approach, with 
only the client's values being discussed within the counseling process”. 
Clarke notes nondirectiveness aims “not to lead clients to make 
particular decisions or choices (those preferred or recommended by the 
clinician, the health service or by society) but to help them to make the 
best decisions for themselves and their families as judged from their 
own perspectives” (Clarke cited in Williams, Alderson, Farsides 2002, 
339).  
The goal of “nondirectiveness means that ‘genetic counselors 
should not impose their personal views on patients’ (Fine, 107). ‘To 
maximize client autonomy, the counselor is to provide information, 
clarify options, and their consequences, and assist clients in reaching 
decisions consistent with their personal values’” (Anderson 1999, 
128). The problem of other minds provides philosophical support for 
these goals. We believe being a virtuous genetic counselor means 
“presenting fact without influencing decision (non-directiveness). The 
couple is provided all the available information about the disease and 
reproductive options open to them, but the decision has to be taken by 
the couple” (Phadke 2004, 154). We argue that this is the best 
approach to counseling because the counselor cannot enter into the 
consciousness or first person lived experience of the counselee and 
therefore cannot really know the best decision to be made.  
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This shows the problem with directive counseling which can 
negatively affect the client's psychological well-being. Our work here 
on the problem of other minds highlights that the counselor should 
trust “clients to make good decisions for themselves that are consistent 
with their own values and needs not assume that the decisions will be 
consistent with those of the providers of counseling” (Ibid). The 
decisions by counselors and counselees need not be consistent because 
they are two unique and individual people. It is a fallacy to assume that 
the counselor knows what is best for the counselee when they can 
never be or enter into the lived conscious experience of that person. 
This is important to show because it has been suggested that “Medical 
doctors find nondirectiveness of counseling as against traditional 
doctor patient relationship, which assumes medical advice as doctor's 
responsibility” (Ibid).  
Phadke (2004, 154) argues the counselee “may ask for help in 
decision making by asking as to what the counselor or other people 
would do in a similar situation, but it is unwise to be drawn into 
expressing personal opinion” (Ibid). We argue the counselor should 
make it clear to the counselee that they are two unique and different 
people and therefore a choice the counselor could make should not 
automatically apply to the counselee. We believe the job of the 
counselor is not to tell the counselee what to do but to help them 
“consider consequences of each decision so that decision is taken after 
careful deliberation and not in haste. Ultimately, it is the consultant, 
and not the counselors, who have to live with the consequences of the 
decision” (Ibid). There are infinite factors that can lead the counselor 
and counselee to have different preferences for decisions such as 
“desire to have children, severity and burden of the disease, personal 
experience with the disease, social and religious views” (Ibid). As a 
result, we argue that genetic counseling must be nondirective 
“noncoercive and nonjudgmental. The couple's decision (even if it is 
different from counselor's personal views) should be respected and 
supported” (Ibid).  
Oduncu highlights other aspects of good genetic counseling. For 
example, “counselors support their counselees in the decision-making 
process by providing impartial and non-directive counseling. To 
achieve this goal, counselors use several techniques to enable 
individuals to weigh the consequences of potential results of the 
genetic tests, and support possibilities to enhance the person’s 
autonomy with respect to the decision” (2002, 53). This is consistent 
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with the dictionary definition of counseling “where ‘to counsel’ is 
defined as ‘to advise’)” (Ibid).  
Our article here is an important addition to the literature on 
nondirectiveness because “studies are lacking in the field of human 
genetics and in other disciplines which address either the theory or 
practice of this type of communication in the context of genetic 
counseling” (Wolff 1999, 23). We highlight why we believe directive 
genetic counseling is problematic. Wolff describes directive genetic 
counseling by saying it occurs when “the counselor defines the 
problem of the patient/client and its cause. The counselor makes 
proposals for further clarification and to overcome difficulties. The 
counselor, therefore, works on the basis of problems and results, aims 
at social agreement and claims the right of the capable to guide the 
non-capable” (Ibid, 28). In directive genetic counseling “the counselor 
assumes great responsibility for the decisions of the client. The 
nondirective approach, on the other hand, is one in which the client 
defines the problem and selects life objectives with the counselor 
helping the client to find ways to achieve the stated goal(s)” (Ibid). We 
use the problem of other minds to support this nondirective approach. 
Our work also aligns with the philosophy of Carl Rogers who “took 
nondirectiveness to be an expression of humility on the part of the 
counselor who does not claim to have the wisdom to solve other 
peoples' problems but is able to assist them” (Ibid). Our ideas on the 
problem of other minds in the next section elucidates why it is 
important “he advised counselors to act with discretion concerning 
decisions and evaluations” (Ibid).  
We disagree that “the health care provider-patient relationship” 
should be paternalistic in genetic counseling where “the health care 
provider holding most of the control and making many of the 
decisions” (Marvin 2000, 21). We believe this is erroneous because the 
provider is not the patient. They are distinct individuals with distinct 
lives and worldviews. The provider will never know what it is to be 
their patient and that is why we believe it is wrong for the provider to 
“define the patient’s problem and prescribe an appropriate solution” 
(Ibid). Marvin says the “directive approach is based on the assumption 
that the provider has more skills and knowledge than the patient about 
health problems and interventions” (Ibid) and our work refutes this by 
showing the relevance of the problem of other minds.  
Our work supports nondirectiveness as a “mainstay for the field of 
genetic counseling” (Ibid).  This is important because nondirective 
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counseling can “empower patients to make autonomous, well-informed 
choices” (Ibid). Nondirectiveness is a suitable response to the problem 
of other minds because it promotes counselee decisions “based on their 
own values and beliefs, without the imposition of the genetic 
counselor’s personal beliefs” (Ibid). As a result, it is good to see the 
commitment to a nondirective approach by the National Society of 
Genetic Counselors’ Code of Ethics. The Code states that “the 
counselor-client relationship is based on values of care and respect for 
the client’s autonomy, individuality, welfare and freedom...genetic 
counselors strive to enable their clients to make informed independent 
decisions, free of coercion, by providing or illuminating the necessary 
facts and clarifying alternatives and anticipated consequences” (Ibid).  
So, what is left for the counselor to do if the counselee should have 
the freedom to direct the counseling session and their decisions during 
the counseling process? In light of our ideas on the problem of other 
minds we argue “the role of the counselor is to ensure that patients 
have accurate information, including knowledge of genetic risks and 
an appreciation of potential consequences of decisions” (Ibid). This 
also means the counselor should help the counselee understand the 
importance of nondirective counseling so as “to develop patients’ 
confidence in their ability to make difficult choices” (Ibid). We believe 
the counselor should help the counselee by providing “a framework of 
issues to consider, and guide them through the decision-making 
process” (Ibid) while maintaining that the counselor does not know the 
best decision for the counselee. We recognize “Genetic professionals 
have expertise about chromosomes; Mendelian inheritance; testing 
methodologies; legal, emotional, and social implications of genetic 
issues” however “this expertise does not necessarily translate into the 
wisdom to make decisions for patients” (Ibid). We recognize that the 
counselor is forever separated from living the life of the counselee and 
therefore we argue nondirective counseling that still makes use of the 
genetic counselor skills is the best approach.  
An example of when the problem of other minds is highlighted is 
when Marvin says, “While knowing a baby has a problem before birth 
may be useful for some families, other families feel more comfortable 
with a ‘wait and see’ approach” (Ibid, 22). In other words, we believe 
the counselor is wrong to direct the counselee into any decision they 
consider is best since every individual is unique and different. Due to 
the problem of other minds “Counselors can provide accurate 
information about genetic risks, procedural risks, specific genetic 
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conditions, and options for dealing with results; but in the end, what is 
right for one family may not be right for another” (Ibid). Because the 
counselor is forever isolated from the first person lived conscious 
experience of their counselee they should never pre-empt their 
decisions for them. This diversity is highlighted by Marvin who says:  
 
some patients may elect prenatal diagnosis so that they can emotionally and 
otherwise prepare for the birth of a child with a disability. Others may elect 
prenatal diagnosis with intentions of terminating an abnormal pregnancy. 
Furthermore, some may decline invasive testing because of concerns about the 
risks of the procedures and a commitment to continue the pregnancy regardless 
of test results. Others may decline to avoid being put in a situation where they 
have to decide about termination or continuation of an abnormal pregnancy 
(Ibid).  
 
Therefore, we argue that there has been an error in nondirectiveness if 
counselees say things such as “We were told not to have children 
based on our carrier status,” or “We were told that I should have 
amniocentesis, given my age,” because this “falsely assumes that 
health care professionals know what’s right for a family” (Ibid) in 
genetic counseling. We want to make it clear that our “nondirective 
approach does not suggest leaving patients on their own to sort through 
these trying choices. Rather, it suggests providing a framework by 
which they might think through the problem and arrive at their own 
decision” (Ibid). We advocate that the role of the counselor in 
“Nondirective counseling is an active process designed to challenge 
patients and to evoke the patients’ competence and ability for self-
direction” (Ibid) so they are able to make their own authentic life 
choices. In other words, counselors should “help their clients arrive at 
the best decisions from personal perspectives and are not guiding them 
towards any particular decision (for example, to test or not to test, to 
terminate a pregnancy or to continue it)” (Elwyn, Gray, Clarke 2000, 
135).   
Elwyn et al (2000) provide a nice framework for shared decision 
making (SDM) and nondirectiveness in genetic counseling which we 
take inspiration from. SDM involves “counselor and the client share 
information on the basis of which a decision is to be made. They then 
discuss their views and come to an agreed decision” (Ibid, 136). SDM 
allows the counselor “to contribute his professional opinion (a valid 
biomedical perspective) into the decision making process, without 
denying the critical importance of the patient’s wider value systems” 
(Ibid). SDM respects counselee autonomy “making SDM a natural 
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approach to the negotiation of management decisions in clinical 
genetics” (Ibid, 137). SDM allows the counselor to have an important 
role in genetic counseling by removing directiveness. The counselor 
should make sure there is “a two way exchange, not only of 
information but also of preferences about plans for management or 
intervention” (Ibid). To overcome the slippery slope problem of no 
counselor involvement in counseling “It is especially important that 
clients/patients do not feel abandoned to make important decisions 
without sufficient support” (Ibid). This is highlighted in one study 
where most women “wanted to hear providers’ recommendations 
about testing. Women still wanted to make their own decision, either 
choosing to follow the provider’s recommendation or choosing to veto 
it” (Ibid). This shows that SDM can provide “an additional and useful 
framework for the complex interactions that inevitably occur in genetic 
consultations” (Ibid, 138).  
We argue counselors should be able “to communicate complex risk 
information accurately while refraining from advice-giving. In this 
sense, nondirectiveness seeks to align informed consent with client 
autonomy” (Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi 2014, 171). This is consistent 
with Carl Rogers who wanted “clients to ‘set the agenda’ and explore 
their own solutions” (Ibid, 173). By using the problem of other minds 
in the next section, we highlight the significance of Rogers ideas and 
why “the shift from ‘content-oriented’ to ‘person-oriented’ counseling 
marks an important break from a medical focus on advice-giving, to a 
psychosocial focus on client autonomy and personal reflection” (Ibid).  
Wolff (2001, 1), gives some more insight into nondirectiveness 
noting that it “has its roots in humanistic psychology”. Our article is 
concerned with showing the problem with directive counseling where 
“the patient is seen as an ‘object’ to be treated” (Ibid, 2). This can 
happen if the problem of other minds is unconscious to the counselor. 
This is when the counselor believes they know the counselee (which 
we call the counselor complex) and what is best for them because the 
“counselor defines the problem and its cause, and makes proposals for 
further clarification and to overcome difficulties. The counselor 
therefore works on the basis of problems and results, aims at social 
agreement, and claims the right of the capable to guide the 
noncapable” (Ibid).  Unfortunately, this counselor complex gains 
momentum when some believe “nondirectiveness only serves to 
transfer sole moral responsibility to the parents and helps the 
counselors wash their hands of any responsibility (‘it is their 
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responsibility and we wash our hands of any responsibility’)” (Wolff 
1999, 34). From our point of view this could not be further from the 
truth and only serves to objectify counselees.  
Our philosophical analysis leads us to prefer nondirectiveness where 
“the patient defines the problem, selects life objectives, and chooses 
the way of adaptation, with the counselor helping the patient to find 
ways to achieve the stated goals” (Wolff 2001, 2). Here the counselor 
is still important by providing genetic information to influence the 
“thinking process; therefore, he/she takes great responsibility for the 
counseling process, but not for the behavior and the decisions of the 
patient” (Ibid).  
Our title for this article is similar to a paper by Wessels, Koole, 
Penn (2015) “‘And then you can decide’ – antenatal foetal diagnosis 
decision making in South Africa”. Our ‘now it’s your choice’ motif is 
similar in that both titles suggest the counselor gives information or 
advice to the counselee, but it is up to the counselee if they believe it is 
useful for their own situation or not. Our reference to ‘take it or leave 
it’ in the title is important not only for the general mindset of the 
counselee in genetic counseling (who are encouraged to take or leave 
using the suggestions from the counselor) but also apply to the 
arguments we outline in this article. Since we also encounter the 
problem of other minds of our readers, we have no proof that our 
arguments should apply or be valid for those who read this and 
therefore we leave it to each individual to determine if our ideas are 
valuable to them or not. To do otherwise would hubristically ignore the 
problem of other minds.  
Thus, we argue “the genetic counselor's role is to provide 
information about the relevant genetic conditions, risks and testing 
options so that women or couples can make informed decisions” (Ibid, 
3314). Because the counselor cannot enter into and experience the life 
or place of the counselee a “non‐ directive approach is advocated with 
the premise that the information given should be unbiased and neutral 
and that the counselor should not influence or advise on a specific 
course of action. This approach is believed to enhance patient 
autonomy and result in informed decision making” (Ibid). This 
nondirective approach recognizes the alterity or otherness of the 
counselee and so “aligns with patient‐ centred communication as both 
emphasize care that is attuned to patients' needs, values and 
preferences” (Ibid).  
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Since the first-person conscious experience of the counselees place 
in the world is shut off from the genetic counselor, they should aim 
“not to guide the patient (or client) to an outcome predetermined by the 
counselor or the genetics service but instead to support the patient in 
reaching their own decisions” (Clarke 2017, 543). We believe the 
genetic counselor is ethical and practices the virtue of nondirectiveness 
by having “no particular outcome in mind” and “is not attempting to 
sway the patient to make one decision rather than another” (Ibid, 553). 
It must be made clear that the counselor has an important job even 
though we advocate they be nondirective. We believe the genetic 
counselor needs to show “concern for the patient and their welfare—
they are not indifferent—and they are interested in how the patient 
makes their decision. In fact, they are more interested in that than in 
the decision that is made” (Ibid).  This highlights the key role of the 
genetic counselor in light of the problem of other minds, the counselor 
is there to assist the counselee to arrive at their own decision best 
suited to their unique place in the world. This is how we understand 
the best way the genetic counselor can act by providing “information 
and explanation, to help the patient understand their situation and 
weigh the information they have been given. This allows them to make 
the best decision they can, a decision with which they, and not the 
counselor, will then have to live” (Ibid).  
The genetic counselor is suited in this role due to their experience of 
seeing “how other families make decisions and the aftermath, can lead 
them to challenge the initial judgements of a patient without wanting to 
supplant their right to make the eventual decision” (Ibid). The 
counselor in our nondirective philosophy of genetic counseling is 
important to clarify when “the patient has misunderstood some fact, or 
has not recognised the relevance of some aspect” (Ibid). This can occur 
when the counselor “recommend that the patient considers some 
potential consequences of their decision without this meaning that the 
professional is wanting to make or impose the decision” (Ibid). This is 
necessary for the counselee to make authentic decisions in their life 
where the goal of the counselor should be to promote “the autonomy 
and self-directedness of the client” (Ibid, 560).  
Statistics from Wolff and Jung (1995, 4) highlight that many 
counselors appear to support nondirective counseling. They quote a 
study that found “more than 75% of all medical geneticists in more 
than 75% of the countries surveyed consider themselves committed to 
the principle of nondirectiveness in genetic counseling”. This is 
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supported by Bartels, LeRoy, McCarthy and Caplan (1997, 176) who 
found “that nondirectiveness is a valued goal of genetic counselors. 
Almost 96% of the sample rated nondirectiveness as very important to 
their clinical practice”. Our article shows in a new light why we 
believe nondirectiveness should continue to have high number of 
adherents and why it is the most “ethically responsible approach to the 
difficulties and consequences of genetic diagnosis” (Wolff, Jung 1995, 
4).  
It is clear to see our ideas lay in the tradition of humanistic 
psychology with its “concerns of supporting the values and decision-
making process of the patient” (Chieng, Chan, Lee 2011, 37). The 
problem of other minds shows why the counselee should define “the 
problem and selects life objectives with the counselor helping the 
client to find ways to achieve the stated goal” (Ibid). We believe it is 
the counselor’s responsibility to understand the problem of other minds 
and act nondirectively, otherwise counseling can be considered 
directive which will “undermine the individual’s autonomy and 
compromise his or her ability to make an autonomous decision” 
(Kessler 1997, 466).  
We agree with Suter (1998, 161) who recognizes that it is ethical for 
“genetic counselors to preserve the ‘autonomous nature of decision 
making’” for counselees. The problem of other minds shows why 
genetic counselors need “to respect the profoundly personal nature of 
reproductive decision making, and to facilitate and support clients’ 
decision making” (Ibid, 162). Broadly stated we agree that “the ethical 
principles of autonomy and beneficence” (Ibid) should underpin 
nondirective genetic counseling. This can occur when the counselor 
facilitates and helps the counselee understand their options. To 
overstep their mark as a counselor is to not understand that “the 
counselor, in most circumstances, does not know what outcome would 
be best for the client; the decisions are ‘deeply personal,’ rather than 
medical” (Ibid). This is overstepping the mark of the counselor 
because their consciousness is forever separated from an experience of 
the mind of the counselee. As a result, we disagree that the counselor 
can “correctly determine the best decision for a particular client” (Ibid, 
163). Instead we believe the role of the genetic counselor is to “lead 
the client to examine her decision more fully and in ways she had not 
contemplated earlier. This could facilitate the decision-making process, 
enhance self-determination, promote autonomy, and therefore advance 
beneficence” (Ibid).  
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The problem of other minds brings into focus why genetic 
counselors should “value and respect the personal nature of decision 
making; the importance of personal freedom, self-determination, and 
reproductive choice” (Biesecker 1998, 146). Later in this paper we will 
highlight how our philosophy of place combined with the problems of 
other minds supports nondirective genetic counseling. One way to 
briefly highlight this is to note that “childbearing is a personal matter 
and because genetic conditions have unique meaning to each family, 
genetic counseling has largely been offered in a nondirective manner” 
(Ibid, 148). In this last part of this section on nondirective genetic 
counseling, we further outline what we believe the role of the 
counselor should be. In particular we highlight the importance of 
dialogue between the counselor and counselee and use the work of 
Mary White (1997; 1998) to elucidate this.  
The problem of other minds highlights the importance of 
nondirective counseling which promotes “informed and independent 
decision-making. To the extent that it minimizes risks of coercion, this 
counseling approach effectively respects client autonomy” (White 
1998, 6) as well as the independence of the mind and consciousness of 
the counselee. With this view of reality, we believe the expertise of the 
counselor comes from an emphasis on the role of deliberation to 
produce “thoroughly reasoned decisions. In such an approach, 
characterized by dialogue, counselors are responsible for ensuring that 
decisions are fully informed and carefully deliberated” (Ibid, 12). 
Because the counselor cannot ethically tell the counselee what to do, 
“counseling remains nonprescriptive, but in the course of discussion 
counselors may introduce unsolicited information and/or challenge 
what they believe are questionable choices. By this means clients can 
be better assured that the decisions they make are fully considered, 
while counselors demonstrate a limited degree of professional 
accountability” (Ibid, 5).  
The problem of other minds shows why counseling needs to “enable 
clients to make informed and independent decisions with minimal risk 
of manipulation or coercion. Nondirective counseling is grounded in 
the belief that clients are capable of solving their own problems” 
(Ibid). Our work supports White who argues “the counselor’s role is to 
provide clients with accurate genetic information and respond to their 
questions and concerns. Counselors minimize the risks of coercion or 
manipulation by communicating in value-neutral terms as much as 
possible” (Ibid). This method requires an important balance by 
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providing “support to clients while respecting their freedom to make 
their own decisions” (Ibid).  
In order to respect the problem of other minds, the counselor needs 
“a stance of moral neutrality” (Ibid, p.6). This means the nondirective 
genetic counseling that we support is “implicitly pro-choice, a position 
that is ideologically in agreement with mainstream feminist values and 
is consistent with the emphasis on patient autonomy” (Ibid). In light of 
our understanding of the problem of other minds we believe the best 
form of genetic counseling emphasizes “dialogue, in which decisions 
arise from a process of deliberation between counselor and client” 
(Ibid, 7). As a result, we agree with White that the “primary goal of 
nondirective counseling is client-education, while the ethical priority is 
to minimize the risk of coercion” (Ibid, 8). This follows Carl Rogers 
client centred counseling where “discussions are led by the questions 
and concerns of clients” (Ibid).  
Instead of imposing their desires, values, needs and decisions on the 
counselee, “the counselor’s role is to view the problem from the 
client’s perspective” (Ibid). Since the counselor and counselee are 
unique individuals it is important that “counselors are trained to be 
alert to their own values and preferences and to speak in value-neutral 
language as much as possible” (Ibid). This can be achieved by 
expressing “information in a number of ways and trying to use 
objective terminology” (Ibid). It is positive to see the Code of Ethics of 
the National Society of Genetic Counselors is consistent with our 
views from the problem of other minds. This is shown in a number of 
places for example  
 
The counselor-client relationship is based on values of care and respect for the 
client’s autonomy, individuality, welfare, and freedom. The primary concern of 
genetic counselors is the interests of their clients. Therefore, genetic counselors 
strive to:  
Respect their client’s beliefs, cultural traditions, inclinations, circumstances, 
and feelings.  
Enable their clients to make informed independent decisions, free of coercion, 
by providing or illuminating the necessary facts and clarifying the alternatives 
and anticipated consequences” (Ibid).  
 
These passages are significant because they show the importance of 
valuing self-determination and respect for individual differences. It 
is important for the genetic counsellor to acknowledge they will 
forever be different and separate from their counselee because they 
cannot enter into their lived experience which is “shaped and 
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limited by numerous factors, including the person’s socioeconomic 
status, education, cultural and religious beliefs, health, significant 
relationships, and the environment within which he or she lives and 
works” (Ibid, 11). As a result of recognizing individual differences 
and the problem of other minds we along with White argue “that 
counseling take the form of a dialogue in which counselor and 
client are mutually involved in the deliberative process” (Ibid, 12). 
Here  
 
both counselor and client have important roles. Counselors would bring to the 
discussion their knowledge and experience and be free to offer additional 
information or question clients’ choices. Clients would bring their values, 
goals, and beliefs, which, if a decision must be made, would provide the 
criteria by which alternatives are evaluated. Clients make their final decisions 
independently, but not until both counselor and client are satisfied that the 
deliberative process has been thoroughly and carefully conducted (Ibid, 13).  
 
We support the view that “If a client seems to be missing important 
points or basing a decision on a narrow view of the circumstances, a 
dialogical counselor can offer additional information and perspectives 
as a way of broadening the client’s understanding or range of options” 
(Ibid). Because we don’t believe the counsellor can ever say what the 
counselee should do, we see their role being limited to “deepening the 
client’s grasp of his or her alternatives” (Ibid). The counsellor’s aim in 
mind should be to help the counselee by minimizing “the likelihood of 
future regret due to some easily avoidable error of omission, 
ignorance, or unanticipated consequences” (Ibid, 14). As a result, in 
response to the problem of other minds, we believe the genetic 
counsellor is limited to helping the counselee achieve “an informed 
and well considered decision, the quality of which is directly related to 
the thoroughness of the deliberative process” (Ibid).  
We suggest the genetic counsellor take note of a framework for 
authenticity which “calls for consideration of clients’ prior beliefs, 
values, and experiences as well as their goals and preferences” (Ibid). 
In our framework the counsellor’s job is to help the counselee come to 
a well-reasoned decision so the counselee can “be confident that they 
have made the best choice possible at that moment in their lives” 
(Ibid). White implicitly highlights the problem of other minds in the 
following key passage  
 
Genetic decisions are highly personal, and in a pluralist society there are no 
common values that could serve as ethical guidelines for the uses of genetic 
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information. This is clear from the kinds of decisions made. While one person 
might perceive raising a child with Down syndrome as imposing intolerable 
suffering on the child or a burden on society, another might view the same 
child as an opportunity for parenting and compassion. While some may want to 
know if they carry a gene for a late onset disorder in order that they may feel 
empowered and responsible, others would rather ignore the burden such 
knowledge might impose. The Asian couple that needs a male child in order to 
maintain a family lineage may be viewed by Americans as discriminating 
against women. Clearly, the differing values and needs of clients must be 
acknowledged and respected (Ibid).  
 
This coupled with our philosophical analysis shows “the only 
prerogative counselors have is to ensure that clients carefully consider 
the full range of personal, practical, and ethical issues that are 
potentially relevant to their decisions” (Ibid, 15). White argues “the 
counselor’s skill will entail determining how much clients want and 
need to know; when to offer additional information or further explore 
clients’ reasoning; and when the decision-making process is 
approaching resolution” (Ibid). She also adds important tips to prevent 
misuse of this method when she says, “Counselors should make it clear 
to clients that the decision is to be made by the client and that the 
counselor’s aim is only to ensure that the decision is informed and 
carefully considered” (Ibid, 16). Her advice is very useful, for example 
“Counselors should ask for permission to introduce unsolicited 
information and question decisions, and ask clients to tell them if they 
feel they are being pressured into a choice that is not their own. Such a 
process could do much to minimize the risk of coercion” (Ibid) and 
prevent the counselee from making decisions which are not their own. 
To respect the problem of other minds the counsellor needs to make 
“use of empathy as a means of understanding clients’ perspectives; 
sensitivity to the particular experiences and concerns of individual 
clients; conscious efforts to avoid manipulating client choices” (Ibid). 
In summary, we believe an ethical nondirective counsellor will be 
“responsible for ensuring that decisions are based on careful 
consideration of all the factors the client identifies as significant” 
(Ibid).  
These principles are aligned to nondirective counselling which we 
define “as clients’ right to noninterference in decision‐ making” 
(White 1997, 297). It must be made clear that this “counseling remains 
nonprescriptive but holds counselors responsible for ensuring that 
decisions are thoroughly and carefully considered” (Ibid). The 
counsellor and counselee aim at a “good decision, defined as one in 
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which clients' values and goals, identified through the deliberative 
approaches of authenticity, effective deliberation, and moral reflection, 
are in equilibrium” (Ibid). This is important because genetic 
counselling should aim at “helping people make some of the most 
important decisions of their lives” by helping “clients to make 
informed and independent decisions” (Ibid, 298).  
Our work advocates nondirectiveness “understood as 
nonprescriptiveness, meaning simply that counselors do not tell clients 
what to do” (Ibid). Instead of the counsellor telling the counselee what 
is right or wrong “the relationship between counselor and client 
becomes one of mutual engagement in problem solving. Counseling 
would consist of a dialogue in which counselor and client are each 
recognized as bringing unique knowledge and experience to the 
decision to be made” (Ibid, 305). The role of the genetic counsellor 
should be to provide “a broad range of medical, psychosocial, and 
moral information, introduce different perspectives as appropriate, and 
thoroughly explore clients' values and choices with them” (Ibid). The 
counsellor should be trained in “introducing information into the 
discussion that clients had neglected or overlooked” (Ibid). Importantly 
“Clients would contribute their respective values, circumstances, goals, 
and beliefs which would serve as the parameters or determining 
criteria of the decision” (Ibid).  As a result, we argue “the counselor's 
aim is not to control the decision but to ensure that all relevant 
information has been considered and that the process by which the 
decision is determined is sound. Clients make their final decisions 
independently, but only when both the client and counselor are 
confident that the client fully understands the implications of the 
decision and its alternatives” (Ibid). The genetic counsellor should 
make sure the counselee considers “‘authenticity,’ ‘effective 
deliberation,’ and ‘moral reflection’” (Ibid, 306) in their choices. 
White explains “Authentic choices are those that are in keeping with a 
person's most cherished values, goals, and beliefs, both rational and 
non-rational, provided they are ‘in character’. Effective deliberation 
most closely resembles the standard definition of competence, and 
implies a conscious, rational evaluation of alternatives and 
consequences based on factual information. Moral reflection requires 
that choices correspond to the moral values of the decision-maker, 
such as belief in the sanctity of life, feelings of responsibility to other 
family members, or concern for how decisions will be interpreted by 
others” (Ibid). Nondirective genetic counsellors also need to  




make it clear that clients should make their own decisions and that the aim of 
counseling is only to ensure that decisions are fully informed and carefully 
considered. They should mention that everyone has particular values and 
communication styles that may inadvertently communicate messages, and 
encourage clients to inform them if they feel they are being pressured into a 
decision that is not their own. Counselors should ask for permission to question 
or challenge choices and explain their reluctance to provide specific advice 
unless it is requested (Ibid, 307).  
 
These recommendations are ethically justified and strengthened when 
combined with the problem of other minds. We believe our 
recommendations do not overstep the mark of counsellor involvement 
in the counselling process. In consideration of the problem of other 
minds and “the variety of values, goals, and circumstances held by 
different individuals, client choices cannot be required to conform to 
any particular ethical standard” (Ibid, 308).  
 
OTHER MINDS  
In this section we outline the problem of other minds which is vital to 
our arguments concerning nondirective genetic counselling. The 
problem of other minds is a problem of scepticism where the “sceptic 
raises a doubt about the possibility of knowledge in connection with 
the mind of another” (Avramides 2019). Avramides explains “Some 
see the problem as arising from reflection on an apparent asymmetry in 
the way I know about my own and another’s mind: in my own case, at 
least most of the time, I know what I think and feel directly and 
without inference from any evidence” (Ibid). In the case of others, “all 
access to what they think or feel is thought to be indirect, mediated by 
the other’s behavior”. The sceptic raises a legitimate philosophical 
problem “How do we know that, for example, another individual is 
angry?” “Do we (ever) know…?” (Ibid). Some believe this is an easy 
problem to depose of. However, it is important to consider the 
seriousness of the problem of other minds. Avramides notes “while 
some draw a parallel between the problem of gaining knowledge of the 
past and of another mind, there is an important asymmetry to be noted 
here: in the case of the past it is at least logically possible that there 
should be direct knowledge, while in the case of another mind such 
knowledge seems to be logically ruled out. As A.J. Ayer writes: It can 
be argued that one’s position to observe a past event is due to the 
accident of one’s position in time…But it is not an accident that one is 
not someone else” (Ibid).  
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Philosophers who have tried to resolve this problem have accepted 
“that, while our knowledge of our own mental states is direct, our 
knowledge of the mental states of others must proceed by reasoning 
from what we observe—the other’s—to what we cannot observe—the 
other’s mental states” (Ibid). This distinction between direct and 
indirect knowledge is important for our arguments supporting 
nondirective genetic counselling. Succinctly put, the counsellor does 
not have direct knowledge of the mental states of their counselee, 
therefore they should not be permitted to be directive in their 
counselling. Many philosophers support the view that the mind of 
another is not directly observable. For example, “as early as the fifth 
century AD, St. Augustine writes: ‘For even when a living body is 
moved, there is no way opened to our eyes to see the mind, a thing 
which cannot be seen by the eyes’” (Ibid). Furthermore “The idea that 
we should have direct knowledge of another’s mental states has also 
come under fire more recently by Colin McGinn, who writes that 
direct perceptual reports specifying the mental states of another ‘seem 
definitely wrong’” (Ibid). The intractability of this problem is 
highlighted when Avramides says “One can twist and turn - make this 
philosophical move or that - but the possibility of one's aloneness in 
the universe remains” (2001, 3).  
The problem of other minds arises because “we know about the 
minds of others in a very different way from the way we know our 
own minds. We know about our own minds partly by introspecting. If I 
am trying to figure out what I think about a certain question, I can 
concentrate on the contents of my conscious mind until I work it out. 
But I can’t concentrate in the same way on the contents of your mind 
in figuring out what you think” (Crane 2015, 47). In other words, “the 
way we know about the states of mind of others is not, so to speak, 
symmetrical to the way we know our own states of mind” (Ibid). Crane 
uses an example of “the different ways we use to know about the 
position of our own bodies and the bodies of others. In order to know 
whether your legs are crossed, I have to look, or use some other form 
of observation or inspection (I could ask you). But I don’t need any 
sort of observation to tell me whether my legs are crossed” (Ibid).  
The counselor needs to recognize the problem of other minds 
because they “can never have direct knowledge of what another is 
feeling or thinking” (Cockburn 2001, 49). All the counselors can 
“actually see is the other’s behaviour, and the judgement that another 
is angry or in pain always involves an interpretation of that behavior” 
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(Ibid). Cockburn highlights the distinction between behavior and 
mental states that constitutes the problem of other minds when he says 
“when one reflects on the fact that a person can pretend to be angry or 
in pain: a person may behave as one who is angry or in pain, and yet 
not be in these states. That, it might be said, is sufficient to show that 
we must draw a sharp distinction between a person’s behaviour and her 
mental states” (Ibid, 28).  
Another way of highlighting the problem of other minds is to note 
“that the content of one's own mental life is immediate or transparent 
to one in the way the content of another's mental life is not. Connected 
with this it is sometimes said that I have a certain privileged access to 
my own mental life or that I have a certain authority with respect to 
what I am thinking or feeling, and that this privileged access or 
authority does not extend to the mental life of anyone else” 
(Avramides 2001, 3). We highlight this below with some statements 
throughout the history of philosophy. The problem of other minds 
shows that other persons do not “have the kind of cognitive access to 
my mental states which they impute to me; hence by being in this kind 
of position one enjoys a kind of special epistemic privilege” (Alston 
1989, 254). Whereas the counselor can be mistaken about how it is to 
be the counselee, the counselee cannot be mistaken how it is to be 
them. By existing they know this and therefore knowing how it is to be 
the counselee for the counselee “‘cannot be false’ (Descartes), ‘are not 
subject to any possible error’ (Lewis), ‘cannot...be...in any way 
mistaken’ (Ayer), ‘it does not make sense to suppose that he is 
mistaken’ (Shoemaker)” (Ibid).  
The problem of other minds is evident again where “for example, 
can I know how you feel when you are depressed, or can I know that 
you see the same colour that I do when you look at the sky on a sunny 
day?” (Avramides 2001, 1). The philosopher brings these types of 
problems to our attention. We have applied this to genetic counseling, 
but sometimes philosophical problems are “taken by the non-
philosopher to amount to either an oddity or an absurdity. A certain 
impatience is often voiced when the philosopher tries to raise this 
question or questions like it” (Ibid). We hope our readers do not react 
in this way and appreciate the problem we present to genetic 
counseling (and counseling or psychotherapy in general). We hope 
“the non-philosopher can see the point of wondering if your depression 
is really like mine, or if you and I have the same colour experience 
when we look at the sky” (Ibid, 2).  
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We vehemently disagree that a way around the problem of other 
minds is to agree with Mill who uses a classic argument from analogy. 
Mill writes “I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, 
because, first, they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own 
case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, 
they exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, which in my own case I 
know by experience to be caused by feelings” (Ibid, 5). The argument 
can be summarized as follows: “(a) an assurance that I have a mind; 
(b) the observation that there is a connection between my mind and the 
behaviour I exhibit; and (c) the observation of a similar sort of 
behaviour (the 'outward signs') in others” (Ibid). We believe this 
reasoning is unethical which ignores alterity and reduces the other to 
an object of observation. The argument from analogy from Mill also 
encourages ideas that we are all the same which is very problematic for 
genetic counseling. Instead we wish the genetic counselor appreciates 
the problem of other minds and that they can never experience being 
the counselee. Avramides summarises by saying “I know my own 
mind immediately and can have the highest degree (or most secure 
form) of knowledge only of my own mind” and “I cannot know any 
other mind in this immediate way and that my knowledge of another 
mind cannot be as secure as that of my own mind” (Ibid, 10).  With 
this understanding we hope the genetic counselor understands why 
nondirectiveness is so important instead of a bossy ‘know it all’ 
directive counseling method.  
In this article we play the role of the sceptic. We understand the 
problem of other minds implicitly comes from the sceptic “writings of 
Descartes, and in particular his Meditations on First Philosophy” (Ibid, 
21). Descartes cogito ergo sum highlights “of our own mind there can 
be no doubt” (Ibid). But with this certainty a problem arises how do I 
come to not have this doubt for the mind of another. The problem is we 
cannot remove this doubt regarding the mind of another. Avramides 
reminds us that  
 
what the sceptics of ancient times despaired of finding is a criterion of truth. 
What Descartes claims to have discovered is that there is at least one truth that 
does not need a criterion. The cogito is such a truth. What Descartes noticed is 
that the cogito is a truth that is self-guaranteeing and as such does not need a 
criterion. It is only truths that go outside the subject that need to be guaranteed 
- these truths are not self-guaranteeing. Once we see this, we can see also that a 
gap opens up between those truths that are self-guaranteeing and those that 
need to be guaranteed (Ibid, 34).  
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Descartes cogito gives rise to the problem of other minds because it 
“leads to a radical scepticism about knowledge of other subjects” (Ibid, 
35). Augustine anticipated that there is a problem of other minds when 
he says “'Know the will of that man', for it is not within our reach to 
perceive at all, either by sense or understanding, unless by corporeal 
signs set forth; and this in such a way that we rather believe than 
understand” (Ibid, 48). This highlights something important for genetic 
counseling “that we can know ourselves, but not another” (Ibid). 
Genetic counselors should be nondirective because any argument they 
make about what is best for the counselee “amounts to little more than 
a hypothesis or conjecture” (Avramides 2002, 64). The reason for this 
that should have been made clear by now is that “the mind of another 
is something that is understood to lie forever outside my direct 
apprehension. I only see your behaviour, but your mind - your thoughts 
and feelings - are things that lie behind what I can see. I can never 
actually see your mind” (Ibid). In sum “Given the kinds of creatures 
that we are, one person's mind is forever hidden from another. This is 
why we can only get at another's thoughts and feelings by analogy, or 
by positing hypotheses” (Ibid). As a result, genetic counseling needs to 
proceed nondirectively because only the counselee knows what is right 
or wrong for them. The counselor is there to help the counselee explore 
the best directions and decision by providing dialogue and information 
but can never know what is best for their counselee. This is evident 
when Avramides (2011, 434) states that given “each person is aware of 
his own affections, and given that he cannot ‘submit’ to the affections 
of another, we cannot know whether what appears to me is of the same 
kind as what appears to another” and therefore it is improper and 
philosophically weak to extrapolate how I believe the other feels based 
on my own experiences. This is supported when George Berkeley 
highlights “that we do not perceive another Mind” and therefore 
“knowledge of the mind of another is only probable” (Ibid, 436).  
The problem of other minds shows that the experience of my own 
mind and that of another are very different. Avramides (2009, 4) says 
“I cannot know another immediately and intuitively; I cannot know 
another in this way. Nor can I perceive the mind of another”. 
Sollberger (2017, 1476) explains this as “a fundamental asymmetry in 
the means of knowledge. In my own case, I can know directly what I 
think and feel. This sort of self-knowledge is epistemically direct in the 
sense of being non-inferential and non-observational. My knowledge 
of other minds, however, is thought to lack these epistemic features”. 
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There is an asymmetry between the “first personal access I have to my 
own psychological attitudes and phenomenal states” (Ibid) and not 
having this access to another. This asymmetry highlights that the 
genetic counselor is restricted from “direct perceptual knowledge of 
another's mental states” (Ibid, 1477). The counselor’s knowledge of 
the mind of their counselee is only a hypothesis for which they “can 
have only indirect, behavioural evidence, so knowledge of someone 
else's mentality must be inferential” (Ibid). This highlights that the 
counselor is limited in their knowledge because they cannot “access 
another living being’s experiential world” and “cannot perceive 
another’s mental states” (Vaaja 2015, 18). The counselor is constantly 
faced with the problem whether they can know what the counselee’s 
“mental states are like, how they feel from the ‘inside’; in particular, 
whether their mental states are like” (Ibid) their own states or 
experiences. This is why we advocate nondirective counseling because 
“whatever knowledge we take ourselves to have of the minds of others, 
it is inferior in comparison with our knowledge of our own minds” 
(Ibid). The counselee has direct experience of their own mind, so they 
are best placed to direct their decision and the genetic counseling 
process.  
This also emphasizes “a conceptual problem: how can we manage 
to have any conception of mental states other than our own?” (Hyslop 
1998). This problem highlights even if in the future by some feat of 
technology the counselor is able to ‘observe’ the mental states of the 
counselee, the problem of other minds would still remain. This shows 
the problem “turns on the question of direct knowledge, not 
observation. Being able to observe the mental states of others would 
not enable us to avoid the problem. What would be needed would be 
the ability to observe those mental states as the mental states of others. 
They would have to come labelled. The situation would only then be 
symmetrical” (Ibid). Yet this is impossible because the only way this 
could happen is to be the other (the counselee). Being able to observe 
mental states as the other without ourselves being present is 
impossible. To eliminate ourselves would just leave the other being 
present and we are back at square one, unable to bridge the problem of 
other minds. Carruthers (2004, 9) agrees with us here when he says, 
“this is impossible I cannot be aware of your experiences, because 
anything which I am immediately aware of is, almost by definition, my 
own experience” and “I should not be able to have the sort of 
immediate awareness of your act of thinking which you have 
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yourself”. As a result, we must resign ourselves to accepting the 
problem of other minds and changing our practice of genetic 
counseling by taking it into consideration.  
We must make it clear that it is important not to agree with the 
perspective of behaviourism in relation to the problem of other minds. 
Rowlands explains  
 
One can think of behaviorism as an eliminativist position or as a reductionist 
position. Understood as an eliminativist position, behaviorism is the view that 
there are no such things as mental states. There is just behavior. That is not so 
much a solution to the problem of other minds but a dissolution—a denial that 
there ever was such a problem. Understood as a reductionist position, on the 
other hand, behaviorism is the view that mental states exist and they are 
simply—one and the same thing as—behavior (2019, 35).  
 
Both of these positions are mistaken and can be very dangerous for 
genetic counseling. First to eliminate mental states is effectively to 
eliminate the counselee and their unique self, being or individuality 
from the world. Second to reduce the mind to behavior is again 
problematic because it assumes the counselor can understand and 
judge the counselee solely through their behavior. Again, this is 
very dangerous because it completely disregards the unique first 
person lived experience of the counselee, effectively foreclosing it 
from any consideration in the counseling process. Interestingly 
Schramme (2010, 33) has recently considered the problem of other 
minds in psychiatry noting “We don’t have direct access to other 
persons’ minds; so how can we ever know what is going on ‘in their 
heads’”. He adds “It poses a severe methodological challenge for 
psychiatry. Historically, it has been tackled by behaviourism, and 
more recently by biological psychiatry”. However, Schramme, like 
us recognises “they don’t provide the kind of knowledge needed 
when dealing with patients”. Our work in this article can be seen to 
extend and expand these brief ideas from Schramme.  
Before we move into the next section we will again highlight 
why the problem of other minds is important to consider in genetic 
counseling. The simplest way to show this is through an example 
from Carruthers (2004, 8). He highlights  
 
How do I know that what I see when I look at a red object is the same as what 
anyone else sees when they look at a red object?” That is: how do I know that 
our experiences are the same? Perhaps what I see when I look at a red object is 
what you see when you look at a green object, and vice versa. The point is: we 
naturally assume that we call objects by the same names (red, green, and so on) 
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in virtue of having the same experiences when we look at those objects; but it 
could equally well be the case that we have different experiences, but the 
differences never emerge because we call those experiences by different 
names.  
 
The detail we wish to derive from this is the counselor can never 
know what is right for their counselee because of the problem of other 
minds. Their understanding of the mind of the counselee will always 
be a hypothesis because they are forever separated from experiencing 
the existence or consciousness of their counselee. For example, “We 
know directly that there seems to be a sunflower in front of us and, in 
particular, how it appears to us, but we do not know directly how it 
appears to others nor, even, that it appears at all to others” (Hyslop 
2013, 6). With this insight we believe nondirectiveness is the most 
ethical and philosophically strong method in genetic counseling. In the 
final section of this article we will integrate our previous research on 
the philosophy of place and psychoanalysis to further support this.  
In conclusion, the “problem of other minds arises from a tension 
between our objective, third person knowledge of human behavior, and 
our apparently subjective, first person knowledge of our own 
conscious states” (Jaworski 2011, 17). The counselor faces a difficulty 
because “You do not have direct access to my mental states, nor do I 
have direct access to yours. You can hide your thoughts and feelings 
from me, and I can hide my thoughts and feelings from you” (Ibid). 
We advocate nondirective genetic counseling because “Thoughts and 
feelings seem to belong to a private, inner domain of subjective 
experiences” and “because I cannot access other people’s mental 
states, I cannot really know what their mental states are” (Ibid). As a 
result, the counselor should be there to participate in dialogue to assist 
the counselee to make their decision, but the counselor can never claim 
to know what is best or what decision the counselee should make.  
While, counselors should not simply tell counselees what to do by 
respecting counselee decisions and how they arrive at them, in order to 
stop counterintuitive consequences and harmful actions, the counselor 
should still have the power to stop any actions they disagree with (e.g. 
where there may be harm, unethical behaviours or in extreme cases, 
like being attacked by the counselee, they should be permitted to stop 
this). As we have stated earlier, the distinct nuances of the 
psychotherapy process can only really be appreciated when the 
influence of the differing depth or level of psychotherapeutic 
exploration that is undertaken within various types of 
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psychotherapeutic relationship is appreciated.  The influence of ‘place’ 
is foundational. On our view, if a disposition to act from certain virtues 
and a keen nuanced awareness of ‘place’ is combined with technical 
skills (techne), distinct knowledge (episteme), intellect (nous), 
theoretical wisdom (sophia), and a well-developed sense of the 
governing virtue practical wisdom (phronesis), then a professional is 
likely to act with discretion and insight (sagacity) at the right time in 
the right way. If this all comes together, then arguably professional 
integrity is assured, the right decisions are made, and the right actions 
follow (Crowden, Gildersleeve 2019). In most genetic counseling 
situations, the counselor will thus be able to act in the right way at the 
right time. We believe nondirectiveness to be a virtue and the 
counselor should practice this principle as much as possible. 
Ultimately all outcomes of counseling sessions are determined through 
a unique place of dialectic or dialogue between the counselor and 
counselee (see Crowden, Gildersleeve 2019). Our ideas concerning 
this outcome take inspiration from our earlier publications on place 
which we discuss next in the final section of this article.  
 
PLACE, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND GENETIC COUNSELING  
In this final section we utilize our previous research on the philosophy 
of place and psychoanalysis to support nondirective genetic 
counseling. Our main thesis is that what is considered right or wrong 
for a counselee depends on their place. In other words, what decision 
is right or wrong in genetic counseling is relative to the place of the 
counselee. Although the decision may be wrong to the counselor from 
their unique place, it may be right for the counselee and this is why 
genetic counseling should be nondirective. Harman provides a useful 
example to get into the right frame of mind:  
 
Consider this example. Intelligent beings from outer space land on Earth, 
beings without the slightest concern for human life and happiness. That a 
certain course of action on their part might injure one of us means nothing to 
them; that fact by itself gives them no reason to avoid the action. In such a case 
it would be odd to say that nevertheless the beings ought to avoid injuring us or 
that it would be wrong for them to attack us. Of course we will want to resist 
them if they do such things and we will make negative judgments about them; 
but we will judge that they are dreadful enemies to be repelled and even 
destroyed, not that they should not act as they do (Harman 1975, 5).  
 
This example can be related to genetic counseling. The outer space 
creatures and humans (or counselor and counselee) have different 
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views of what is right or wrong. The arguments we have presented in 
this article have led us to support ethical relativism in this situation 
where “there can be conflicting moral judgments about a particular 
case that are both fully correct” (Harman 1978, 146). Both the 
counselor and counselee have a different place in the world and 
therefore both views can be correct from their respective places. As a 
result, the counselor should respect the place of the counselee, so they 
are free to make the decisions that are right for them. If the counselor 
was to not do this they put the counselee at risk of being estranged 
from their unique place in the world (Gildersleeve, Crowden 2018, 
79). Our earlier publications have provided much detail on the 
importance of being ‘at home in the world’ for mental health by 
discovering place. Our earlier work shows that the aims of 
psychoanalysis are to “return’ to place — as a homecoming” (Ibid, 79) 
otherwise a counselee will experience the obstructiveness of a complex 
from ‘not-being-at-home-in-the world’. As a result, the genetic 
counselor has a responsibility to ensure they do not estrange their 
counselee from their place in the world by giving directive counseling 
that does not respect place and the problem of other minds. Directive 
counseling can lead the counselee to lose their authentic Self or place 
when they do not direct their own decisions.  
In our earlier research (Gildersleeve, Crowden 2018) we illustrate 
that complexes are formed when a person forecloses or leaves their 
place in the world hidden from conscious discovery or understanding. 
We described the phenomenology of the experience of a complex and 
how psychoanalysis helps an analysand achieve a ‘homecoming’ to 
their place in the world. Place or Self can remain unconscious or 
‘misrecognised (Gildersleeve 2016, 8) if the counselee does not follow 
the ethics of Lacanian psychoanalysis to act in “conformity with the 
desire that is in you” (Lacan 1992, 314). When place is not 
acknowledged individual mental health is challenged. Thus, directive 
genetic counseling will potentially contribute to mental illness through 
the formation of complexes (Gildersleeve 2017; 2018) if the counselee 
is not permitted the freedom to make their own choices in nondirective 
counseling. The counselee will develop an obstructive complex from 
directive counseling because he is not permitted to take “into account 
the actuality of his subjective needs and requirements” (Jung 1923, 
420). Directive counseling restricts the counselee from acting in 
“conformity with the desire that is in you” (Lacan 1992, 314) and 
therefore misdirects their life away from their authentic place in the 
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world. Jung explains “functional (nervous) or actual physical disorders 
which result from this state have a compensatory significance” (Jung 
1923, 420) as a consequence of neglecting the authentic Self. This 
occurs when directive counseling alienates the counselee from their 
Self (Jung), subject (Lacan), Dasein (Heidegger) or place (Malpas). If 
the counselee is not allowed self-expression through nondirective 
counseling to act in conformity with their desire, they remain at an 
imaginary or alienated relationship to their Self and place etc.  
If the counselee is not given the freedom to make their own life 
choices and are directed into the ‘right’ decision by the counselor, the 
counselee will live a life estranged from the home of their authentic 
place in the world leading to experiences of angst and obstructive 
complexes (Gildersleeve 2018, 194). Their life will feel obstructive, 
unharmonious and ‘not at home’ because they have left their place 
(authentic Self) undiscovered. Their world will become obstructive and 
friction riddled rather than in congruence with the world. This supports 
the tenets of Lacan’s ethics of psychoanalysis where “the paradoxical 
reversal by means of which desire itself (i.e., acting upon one’s desire, 
not conceding it) can no longer be grounded in any ‘pathological’ 
interests or motivations and thus meets the criteria of the Kantian 
ethical act, so that ‘following one’s desire’ overlaps with ‘doing one’s 
duty’” (Zizek 2014, 382). If the counselee does not listen to themselves 
and is directed by the counselor, they neglect ‘acting in conformity 
with their desire’ causing “compensatory reactions from the side of the 
unconscious” (Jung 1923, 422). The counselee will be obstructed by 
this complex and “Through this reaction of the unconscious, another 
category of symptoms arises which have a more introverted character.” 
(Ibid).  
In other words, if the counselee is prevented from following the 
ethics of psychoanalysis by compromising their desire through 
directive genetic counseling, the “Superego is the revenge that 
capitalizes upon our guilt—that is to say, the price we pay for the guilt 
we contract by betraying our desire” (Zizek 2005, 69). Said differently, 
the counselee will experience guilt (from the Superego) for failing to 
discover their authentic place in the world.  
Although the counselee may not be conscious of it, they are always 
guilty for not knowing their ultimate place in the world. However, the 
counselee can be more or less authentic depending on the depth of the 
understanding of their place in the world. Conscience (the Superego) 
summons/calls the counselee “to its ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-
“Now it’s your choice”: Nondirective genetic counseling 
349 
 
self, by summoning it to its ownmost quality of being a lack” 
(Heidegger 1996, 249). We interpret this lack to refer to place. The 
counselee always lacks an understanding of their true (authentic) place 
in the world and therefore can never erase or get in front of this lack. 
Said otherwise, absolute “Self-Consciousness itself is radically 
unconscious” (Žižek 2009, 246). The counselee’s conscience is 
important to uncover place because it leads to psychological growth 
and “this ‘growth’ is the objective activity of the psyche, which, 
independently of conscious volition, is trying to speak to the conscious 
mind through the inner voice and lead him towards wholeness” (Jung 
1954, 183). Here Jung emphasizes the role of the psychotherapist or 
counselor is to help the counselee find their own authentic conscience 
(therefore implicitly place) by saying, “we physicians of the soul are 
compelled by professional necessity to concern ourselves with the 
problem of personality and the inner voice, however remote it may 
seem to be” (Ibid, 184).  
The call of conscience calls the counselee to understand their 
thrownness (place) authentically. The call of conscience is always with 
a counselee, but they can inauthentically conceal this call by listening 
to the ‘loudness’ of the idle talk of ‘the they’ (Heidegger 1996, 107). 
The ‘they’ is the common average and similar ways humans 
understand each other. There is no unique, individual identity for the 
‘they’. Everyone is the same. By being-with-others in this way, 
directive genetic counseling can conceal the counselee’s conscience or 
own authentic possibilities, choices and preferences. In this way, the 
counselee can fall into a ‘levelled’ or ‘common’ existence instead of 
making and living by their own authentic decisions. Being-with-others 
by following their ‘common’ mode of being-in-the-world in directive 
counseling neglects the authentic Self and meaning of the counselee’s 
unique place in the world. In contrast, Jung advocates listening to an 
authentic conscience arising out of one’s most intimate being when he 
says, “the inner voice is the voice of a fuller life, of a wider, more 
comprehensive consciousness” (Jung 1954, 184). In other words, 
conscience calls the counselee to expand consciousness to find their 
authentic place in the world which can be facilitated through 
nondirective genetic counseling.  
We argue that directive genetic counseling is unhealthy for the 
counselee because it “does violence to a multitude of subjective 
emotions, intentions, needs, and desires, since it robs them of the 
energy which is their natural right” (Jung 1923, 423). If the counselee 
Matthew Gildersleeve and Andrew Crowden 
350 
 
is prevented self-expression by not being permitted to act in 
‘conformity with their desire’, their conscience and guilt will forever 
return as an obstructive complex in their world. Ultimately, this 
inauthentic understanding constructed by directive counseling that tries 
to be “relieved of the unbearable pressure” (Gildersleeve 2017, 8) to 
act ‘in conformity with the desire that is in you’ culminates in 
complexes alienating the counselee from the truth and meaning of their 
place in the world, resulting in the world continuing to be 
“conspicuously and obstinately obstructive” (Ibid).  
Said differently, directive genetic counseling that does not allow the 
counselee to act freely can lead to “the return of the living dead” which 
is when their desire “does not want to stay dead but returns again and 
again to pose a threat to the living” (Zizek 1992, 22). When the 
counselee does not ‘act in conformity with their desire’, the desire 
returns as an obstructive complex because it was “not properly buried, 
i.e., because something went wrong with their obsequies” (Ibid, 23). 
Jung (1923, 425) describes this return of an obstructive complex by 
saying it shows itself:  
 
in the form of a nervous collapse. Such a solution always comes about as a 
result of the unconscious counterinfluence, which can ultimately paralyse 
conscious action. In which case the claims of the unconscious force themselves 
categorically upon consciousness, thus creating a calamitous cleavage which 
generally reveals itself in two ways: either the subject no longer knows what he 
really wants and nothing any longer interests him, or he wants too much at 
once and has too keen an interest but in impossible things.  
 
This nervous collapse “which can ultimately paralyse conscious 
action” is “The ‘return of the living dead’” and is “the reverse of the 
proper funeral rite. While the latter implies a certain reconciliation, an 
acceptance of loss, the return of the dead signifies that they cannot find 
their proper place in the text of tradition” (Zizek 1992, 23). In other 
words, an obstructive complex will return as the living dead ‘creating a 
calamitous cleavage’ until the counselee ‘acts in conformity with their 
desire’. Nondirective counseling allows the desires of the counselee to 
“find their proper place in the text of tradition” because they have not 
been foreclosed.  
One reason acting in conformity with your desire is important to 
follow and is considered the ethics of psychoanalysis is because “The 
suppression of infantile and primitive claims, which is often necessary 
on ‘civilized’ grounds, easily leads to neurosis, or to the misuse of 
narcotics such as alcohol, morphine, cocaine, etc. In more extreme 
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cases the cleavage ends in suicide” (Jung 1923, 425). The obstructive 
complex and guilt will only be resolved if the counselee adheres to the 
ethics of psychoanalysis to take the journey to discover the 
possibilities and impossibilities of their desire (Gildersleeve, Crowden 
2018, 90). Through nondirective genetic counseling the counselee can 
act in conformity with their desire to discover their authentic Self and 
meaning of their place in the world which highlights why “following 
one's desire' overlaps with 'doing one's duty” (Zizek 2011, 239). This 
demonstrates that psychoanalysis elucidates the importance of 
nondirective genetic counseling by outlining the mechanisms “of 
unconscious tendencies that, just in so far as they are deprived of their 
energy by a lack of conscious recognition, they assume a 
correspondingly destructive character” (Jung 1923, 426).  
If the counselee neglects ‘acting in conformity with their desire’ “it 
disappears from consciousness and proceeds to unfold a subconscious 
activity, which runs counter to conscious aims, even producing effects 
whose causation is a complete enigma to the individual” (Ibid, 438). 
Directive genetic counseling can cause this where the desire of the 
counselee becomes experienced as the obstructiveness of a complex 
which “is that which objects, that which disturbs the smooth running of 
things” (Zizek 2009, 17). This experience of the chaos and 
obstructiveness of a complex indicates that the counselee has left part 
of their place in the world or authentic Self undiscovered. In other 
words, when the counselee experiences the obstructiveness of complex 
by being denied nondirective genetic counseling, this is “nothing but 
the inscription of the subject itself in the field of objects, in the guise of 
a blotch that takes shape only when part of this field is anamorphically 
distorted by the subject’s desire” (Zizek 2006, 69). Directive 
counseling discourages and restricts the counselee from following their 
desires therefore leading their place (authentic Self) to be left 
undiscovered which will be experienced as an obstructive complex.  
 
CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, our work supports the idea that in order to facilitate “an 
individual or family's decision making by providing unbiased 
information and assisting them in exploring their own views regarding 
the available options” (Fine 2017, 107) genetic counselors should 
develop humility, open-mindedness, unassuming judgment and respect 
for alterity, otherness and difference in ways that are consistent with 
the nature of virtuous genetic counseling. We consider these as having 
Matthew Gildersleeve and Andrew Crowden 
352 
 
distinct relevance to genetic counseling and as such are important 
extensions on the usual psychotherapy (counseling) virtues or 
regulative ideals identified elsewhere as compassionate empathy, 
respectful positive regard, congruence and trustworthiness. Moreover, 
our work on the problem of other minds and principles from 
psychoanalysis and our philosophy of place bolsters the argument that 
a counselee should “make his/her own decision free of coercion and/or 
influence of the counselor as is humanly possible” (Ibid). As a result, 
we agree that the genetic counselor “must treat patients in such a way 
that facilitates their ability to make choices and take actions based on 
their personal beliefs and values” (Ibid, 108).  
Our conception of nondirective counseling doesn’t mean the 
counselor is completely passive and has no role to play. A disposition 
to act from certain virtues and a keen nuanced awareness of ‘place’ is 
combined with technical skills (techne), distinct knowledge (episteme), 
intellect (nous), theoretical wisdom (sophia), and a well-developed 
sense of the governing virtue practical wisdom (phronesis) guides 
genetic counseling practice. The role to provide “comprehensible 
information in a supportive milieu so that patient autonomy can be 
preserved as they make reproductive and treatment decisions” (Ibid) 
can thus be enacted ethically. The counselor should not tell the 
counselee what to do but they should be trained to provide accurate 
genetic information as well as presenting various options to facilitate 
“autonomous decision making for a patient or family” (Ibid). We 
outlined the psychological consequences if the counselee is prevented 
self-expression. We believe the counselor should promote “the 
expression and utilization of the counselee's own values in decision 
making” “in contrast to a more authoritarian medical model” (Weil 
2000, 122) which can lead to adverse psychological outcomes for the 
counselee. In light of the arguments we have presented on nondirective 
genetic counseling, the problem of other minds, psychoanalysis and 
place, we conclude the genetic counselor’s expertise involves 
enhancing “the decision-making process and ensuring that clients have 
the greatest opportunity to evaluate options to make the best decisions 
for themselves” (White 1997, 305). Finally, our reference to counselee 
choice in the title is important not only for the general mindset of the 
counselee in genetic counseling (who are encouraged to take or leave 
using the suggestions provided by the counselor) but also apply to the 
arguments we outline in this article. Since we also encounter the 
problem of other minds of our readers, we have no proof that our 
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arguments should apply or be valid for those who read this and 
therefore we leave it to each individual to determine if our ideas are 
valuable to them or not. To do otherwise would hubristically and 
hypocritically ignore the problem of other minds.  
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